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Question 
1. What are the different examples of use of innovative finance mechanisms such as Social 
Impact Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) in India or other low- and middle-
income country settings to deliver results in primary and secondary education?  
2. What are the nature of technical supports offered to implement these mechanisms?   
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1. Executive summary 
Traditionally, financing for social development in development settings has utilised bonds and 
guarantees. These mechanisms focused primarily on resource mobilization by leveraging the 
balance sheets of international finance institutions to make loans. However, since the mid-2000s, 
innovative financing has encouraged alternative models where private sector actors share the 
risks and rewards. For example through results-based financing mechanisms such as 
performance-based contracts or awards and prizes (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 1). 
Innovative financing mechanisms such as those above have a dual role of, firstly, enabling a 
broad range of approaches to mobilizing resources. And secondly, increasing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of financial flows that address global social and environmental challenges 
(Lampert 2014: 5). Innovative financing is designed to complement traditional international 
resource flows, including aid, foreign direct investment, and remittances, and mobilize additional 
resources for development including through private investors (Innovative Financing Initiative 
2014: v). Such approaches can often be categorised as ‘results-based financing’ (Innovative 
Financing Initiative 2014: 4) or ‘payment by results’ (Floyd et al. 2017).  
From a developmental perspective, this emerging ‘social development’ model encompasses two 
recent and clearly-defined global trends: firstly, an increased focus on programmes that deliver 
results and, secondly, an increased drive to support collaboration between the public and private 
sector (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: v). Among such approaches, ‘impact investment’ is a 
recent and growing model, implemented through multi-partner mechanisms such as Social 
Impact Bonds and Development Impact Bonds (Terway 2018; Floyd et al. 2017).  
Evidence suggests that, in recent years, there has been a significant growth in the application of 
impact bonds in a range of global settings, including for education in LMICs. These mechanisms 
are seen to be particularly valuable when operating in complex, fluid contexts (REACH 2017), 
and, with appropriate design, can also contribute towards the development of wider systemic 
capacity. There is also an emerging literature offering guidelines for the development and 
implementation of these models. These form the basis of a range of technical support 
interventions that can be used to assist in their development. However, due in part to their 
relative newness, there also exist a number of issues over the perceived value of these models 
from a market perspective (Lampert 2014: 13; Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 20), plus a 
lack of evidence on their effectiveness from a social development perspective (Terway 2018). 
This study undertook a broad review of recent surveys on innovative finance mechanisms, with a 
particular focus on education in LMICs. This produced a longlist of approximately 20 different 
currently-used innovative financing mechanisms mentioned in documents published between 
2010-2018. These include mechanisms associated with both international finance (i.e. for global 
education and/or donor-led finance) and domestic finance (i.e. country-specific mechanisms). In 
addition, across the documents reviewed, there is a large diversity of models featured: innovative 
financing is a complex area of research, with many possible variable models. In addition, there is 
a broad diversity of terminology used by different analysts and service providers to refer to 
largely similar mechanisms. As a result, the process of gathering and reviewing the 
documentation required to present a clear picture of the innovative financing field can be quite 
time consuming. 
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In terms of content, much of the literature on innovative financing for development discusses the 
mechanisms and procedures from the perspective of financial management rather than from the 
perspective of social development. In this context, the primary measures of effectiveness are in 
terms of each mechanism’s ability to attract investment, mobilise resources and provide a return 
on investment (see, for example, Lampert 2014; Terway 2018; Innovative Financing Initiative 
2014; Leading Group 2012; Loder et al. 2013). As a result, the literature places a particular focus 
on key developmental sectors seen as ‘high-yield’ (e.g. global health, agriculture and food 
security, and climate, environment and energy), and limits the discussion of education. 
Finally, across the majority of documents looking at innovative financing, there is no substantial 
mention made of those specific mechanisms included in the request question itself: Social Impact 
Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs). Any information on these mechanisms 
comes from a small number of documents published since 2013 which look specifically at SIBs 
and DIBs. Within this, these documents are either associated with small number of education 
projects launched in development contexts within last 3 years, or draw on programmes 
previously launched in the UK or US (e.g. Floyd et al. 2017). 
  
4 
 
2. An overview of innovative financing for development 
Introduction 
This section provides a summary overview of literature on innovative financing for development, 
establishing the historical background for the emergence of innovative financing for development 
over the last decade, and outlining the current context for the application of such mechanisms at 
a general level. The section goes on to outline some of the challenges associated with innovative 
financing for development, as identified in the existing literature, and provides some further 
comment on the findings. 
A historical overview of innovative financing for development 
The use of innovative financing mechanisms for development has been an emerging trend in a 
range of global and domestic contexts for approximately the last decade.  
Historically, developmental financing has utilised bonds and guarantees. These mechanisms 
focus primarily on resource mobilization by leveraging the balance sheets of international finance 
institutions to make loans: donors and national governments either promised to repay those 
loans in the future or accepted the risk that projects may not succeed. However, since the mid-
2000s, innovative financing has encouraged alternative models where private sector actors share 
the risks and rewards, for example through results-based financing mechanisms such as 
performance-based contracts or awards and prizes (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 1). 
In general terms, analysts present innovative financing in development, such as the mechanisms 
above, as having a dual role of, firstly, enabling a broad range of approaches to mobilizing 
resources and, secondly, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of financial flows that 
address global social and environmental challenges (Lampert 2014: 5). This might include, for 
example, new mechanisms for using existing funds in an innovative manner to improve 
developmental results and to make the funds go further, and/or new mechanisms for raising and 
managing additional funds from new sources (Bellinger, Terway & Burnett, 2016, cited in Terway 
2018). In short, innovative financing is designed to complement traditional international resource 
flows, including aid, foreign direct investment, and remittances, and mobilize additional resources 
for development (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: v). 
In terms of developmental sectors, much of the literature discussing innovative financing for 
development places a particular focus on financing mechanisms associated with key sectors 
including global health, agriculture and food security, and climate, environment and energy 
(Burnett and Bermingham 2010: 13). This focus has come about primarily because such sectors 
are seen by analysts to have strong potential for investment through technical innovation, and for 
high returns on investment. A number of analysts acknowledge that, in comparison with these 
high-investment-potential sectors, education in general requires long-term investment and offers 
only low financial returns for investors (Terway 2018; Innovative Financing Initiative 2014; 
Leading Group 2012). 
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Current and emerging trends in innovative financing for 
development 
In terms of approach, it is suggested that innovative financing for development is shifting its goals 
away from a focus on mechanisms for the mobilization of resources through innovative 
fundraising and investment approaches, and towards a focus on mechanisms for the delivery of 
positive developmental outcomes through market-based instruments (Innovative Financing 
Initiative 2014: iv). As evidence of this, approaches to innovative financing for development over 
the last decade have seen a growth of mechanisms for investment in social development 
models, with current examples of targeted investment opportunities within agriculture, energy 
and infrastructure in particular (Lampert 2014: 11). 
From a developmental perspective, this emerging ‘social development’ model encompasses two 
recent and clearly-defined global trends: firstly, an increased focus on programmes that deliver 
results and, secondly, an increased drive to support collaboration between the public and private 
sector (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: v). Some argue that, in a development context, the 
third role of innovative financing is to encourage private sector or entrepreneurial expertise and 
knowledge, in order to help address specific sectoral, state-based or market-led failures in 
delivery and overcome institutional barriers (DFID 2015: 3). 
Based on the above, Lampert (2014: 11) anticipates an increase in outcomes-based approaches 
to innovative financing within the development sphere. In particular, risk-sharing and incentives 
can attract private capital and private-sector engagement in developmental contexts, otherwise 
regarded as ‘emerging markets’. Such approaches can be categorised as ‘results-based 
financing’ (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 4) or ‘payment by results’ (Floyd et al. 2017). 
These terminologies refer to mechanisms which use incentive-based payments to increase the 
performance of investments and to transfer risk from the investor that funds the delivery of goods 
and services to the company or NGO that provides the goods and services. Most results-based 
financing mechanisms, such as performance-based contracts and advance market commitments 
are direct contracts between the public sector and a non-state implementer, who may be a 
private sector partner, a CSO, an NGO, or a consortium of different stakeholder types. 
As evidence supporting Lampert’s anticipated increase in outcomes-based approaches, results-
based or payment-by-results financing implemented through public-private partnerships has 
grown rapidly in value as a proportion of financing for development, from $4 million in 2003 to 
$1.3 billion in 2012 (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 4). 
At the level of developmental policy, evidence of the adoption of this approach is present within, 
for example, DFID’s 2015 strategic model focussing on ‘development capital’ (DFID 2015). This 
presents the private sector as ‘a driver of growth and development’ (DFID 2015: 1) and a key 
contributor of capital for the support of development (DFID 2015: 2). DFID’s development capital 
strategy focusses on public investment in the private sector to achieve development objectives 
(DFID 2015: 1) rather than vice-versa. In this context, it is the public investor that is taking the 
risk, rather than the private sector partner. Under DFID’s model, any investment returns are paid 
back from the private sector recipient to the public sector borrower, thereby releasing those funds 
for further public investment. DFID also argue that this model encourages the further 
engagement of private investors by using public funds to demonstrate the ‘feasibility of private 
investment in geographical areas and sectors’ (DFID 2015: 3). 
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As an aside made from the perspective of this study, it is important to note that DFID’s 
development capital strategy makes no specific mention of education as a sector for investment, 
and instead focusses on those sectors already identified by commentators cited in this study as 
high-yield investment areas, namely: agriculture, infrastructure, climate and energy, and health 
(DFID 2015: 6). This is also reflected in the cases cited in DFID’s strategy document. 
Challenges associated with innovative financing for development 
Despite its benefits, innovative financing for development, as represented by a range of results-
based or payment-by-results models involving partnerships between public and private-sector 
stakeholders, currently remains a small component of public sector development assistance, 
whether at a global or a national level. Innovative financing mechanisms such as these represent 
only a small component of ODA, and an even smaller percentage of government expenditures in 
developing countries and foreign direct investment (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: viii). 
While, in a developmental context, the public sector and the donor community has expressed 
strategic interest in engaging with the private sector, to date few successful and long-term 
partnerships have been formed. 
Analysts suggest that there are a number of factors that are seen to contribute to this.  
Firstly, at a global level, among a range of global development financing bodies there is no 
common, clear definition of innovative financing for development, and the language involved 
remains ‘opaque and imprecise’ (Lampert 2014: 13; Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 20).  
For example, the World Bank describes innovative financing as involving: 
‘non-traditional applications of solidarity, PPPs, and catalytic mechanisms that (i) support 
fund-raising by tapping new sources and engaging investors beyond the financial 
dimension of transactions, as partners and stakeholders in development; or (ii) deliver 
financial solutions to development problems on the ground’  
(World Bank 2009, cited in Lampert 2014: 13 and Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 3) 
On the other hand, OECD describes innovative financing as comprising of: 
‘mechanisms of raising funds or stimulating actions in support of international 
development that go beyond traditional spending approaches by either the official or 
private sectors, such as: 1) new approaches for pooling private and public revenue 
streams to scale up or develop activities for the benefit of partner countries; 2) new 
revenue streams (e.g. a new tax, charge, fee, bond raising, sale proceed or voluntary 
contribution scheme) earmarked to developmental activities on a multi-year basis; [or] 3) 
new incentives (financial guarantees, corporate social responsibility or other rewards or 
recognition) to address market failures or scale up ongoing developmental activities’  
(OECD 2009, cited in Lampert 2014: 13 and Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 3) 
The Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development describe innovative financing as: 
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‘mechanisms for raising funds for development, which are complementary to official 
development assistance and are ‘aimed at correcting the negative effects of 
globalisation.’  
(Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development, cited in Lampert 2014: 13 and 
Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 3). 
While there is clearly some overlap between the concepts outlined above, there is substantial 
scope for misinterpretation of what the practicalities of innovative financing might actually involve. 
Some analysts argue that, in the context of international and global development, few institutions 
have the capacity, mandate, or experience with innovative financing mechanisms necessary to 
create new products or to evaluate the risks of existing ones (Innovative Financing Initiative 
2014: 20). In a development context, the same issues may also exist at state or national as well 
as institutional level (DFID 2015: 3). 
Secondly, analysts suggest that current innovative financing mechanisms lack the clear and 
compelling product definition that private sector investors require. Lack of standards, data, 
liquidity, and performance metrics makes it difficult for investors to assess innovative financing 
opportunities (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 23), and thus the opaque language and 
limited understanding of innovative financing business models seen in development financing 
contexts is seen to reduce the supply of private capital.  
Thirdly, analysts suggest that innovative financing for development is hampered by what is 
described as an ‘inefficient market’. For example, a lack of investment in design limits innovation 
and increases the costs associated with introducing new instruments. Creating new innovative 
financing mechanisms - especially mechanisms without evidence-based track records - can be 
very costly (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 24). The cost of developing and deploying new 
mechanisms, the limited participation of investors beyond the traditional aid community, and the 
lack of effective feedback loops have thus far prevented innovative financing from reaching its 
potential (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: viii). 
Fourthly, many current innovative financing mechanisms for development, particularly those still 
in the nascent stage, fail to offer risk-return profiles that fit investor requirements. Similarly, many 
models do not have enough performance data to establish a mature asset class. Newer 
mechanisms, including SIBs and DIBs, are still being developed and will require substantial 
support from concessional donors before they can attract private capital and scale beyond the 
pilot stage. As of 2014, no known DIBs had been successfully issued, although many were under 
development (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 7-8). 
In commenting on the issues outlined above, it is noteworthy that these challenges are presented 
primarily from the perspective of financial investment actors rather than social development 
actors. As indicated by the availability of evidence in this field, the current literature on innovative 
finance is dominated by publications produced by bodies or institutions engaged with global 
finance and investment rather than those concerned with international development, and to a 
certain extent, it is their concerns that are reflected in any analysis of the challenges associated 
with innovative financing for development. There are some exceptions to this (see, for example 
Floyd et al. 2017; Drew & Clist 2015), but such considerations should be kept in mind.  
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3. An overview of innovative financing for education in 
developmental contexts 
Introduction 
The previous section set out the historical background for the emergence of innovative financing 
for development, and the current general context surrounding the application of such 
mechanisms. 
Building on this, the following section looks in particular at discussions of innovative financing for 
education in a development context. It starts with a brief overview of what commentators suggest 
innovative financing might seek to achieve within the education sector, and goes on to outline the 
range of innovative financing mechanisms that analysts have associated with educational 
interventions since 2010. It concludes with some further commentary on the findings.  
The objectives of innovative financing for education 
In discussing the use of innovative financing mechanisms within an educational context, Burnett 
& Bermingham (2010) identify five possible objectives that any mechanisms might seek to 
achieve. These include: 
i. resource mobilization, to address financing gaps in education; 
ii. improving educational effectiveness, efficiency and equity, in particular relation to 
issues such as high levels of repetition and dropout, teacher absenteeism, regressive 
patterns of spending at secondary and higher levels, and inefficient private spending 
especially on tutoring; 
iii. profile raising, to ensure education receives appropriate levels of policy prioritisation; 
iv. meeting the educational needs of fragile and conflict-affected countries; 
v. stimulating innovation in education, in particular through exploiting the increased 
availability of new information and communication technologies to transform 
educational delivery by opening up the sector to new delivery mechanisms. 
(Burnett & Bermingham 2010: 9, 14-15) 
While Burnett & Bermingham are discussing the use of innovative financing for education at the 
level of global development, the majority of the objectives cited above are equally applicable as 
objectives for the use of innovative financing in a domestic or national context. 
Potential models and mechanisms for innovative financing for 
education 
Across the contexts of both international and domestic development, the literature cites a broad 
range of possible models of innovative financing for education, including payment-by-results and 
public-private partnerships alongside a number of other approaches. While both global and 
domestic financing models are cited, across the literature there is a particular focus on those that 
operate between parties operating at global or international levels. 
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Burnett and Bermingham (2010: 15-20) present over 20 different options for innovative financing 
for education, arranged according to various functional categories including: resource 
mobilisation at both international and domestic levels; effective international financial delivery; 
and effective domestic resource delivery. Examples of models cited include: 
 Education Venture Funds (EdVFs) 
 Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
 Cash On Delivery aid (COD) 
 Fast Track Initiatives (FTIs) 
 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Diaspora Bonds 
 Debt Swaps 
 International legacy funds 
Refining these options further, CABRI (2012: 19) presents case studies associated with the 
following models: 
 Cash on Delivery aid (COD), as an example of innovative finance from an 
international donor; 
 The Education Venture Fund (EdVF), as an example of innovative finance from an 
impact investor in equity finance; 
 Indian School Finance Company (ISFC), as an example of innovative finance from an 
impact investor in debt finance;  
 The 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Trust, as an example of innovative finance from a 
philanthropic organisation; 
 Diaspora bonds, as an example of innovative finance from the diaspora community. 
In 2010, The Leading Group’s Task Force for Education published a first report (‘2+3=8, 
Innovating in Financing Education’, 2010) which outlined 9 possible innovative financing 
mechanisms to broaden the fundraising base. In 2012, a further Leading Group report focussed 
on 4 of these mechanisms which were assessed as most likely to efficiently raise money for 
education in low-and middle-income countries as well as being best suited to overcoming 
inequalities in education. Although the 2012 report goes on to discuss a number of further 
initiatives, the 4 mechanisms identified as the most efficient were: 
 the Education Venture Fund; 
 Debt Conversion Development Bonds; 
 Diaspora Bonds; 
 Travellers Savings Fund for Development 
(The Leading Group 2012: 8)  
More recently, in addressing the issues facing out-of-school children and youth in particular, 
UNESCO (2016) summarise a broad range of 12 innovative financial mechanisms that may 
operate in providing access to primary and lower-secondary education. They also look at 
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examples currently used in specific low- and middle-income countries from around the world to 
enable access to primary and lower-secondary schooling. Those cited include: 
 Education Impact Bonds; 
 Debt Swaps; 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); 
 Diaspora Bonds and various forms of tax and excise.  
Bellinger et al. (2016) assessed 18 innovative financing mechanisms for education against a 
range of criteria, including: positive impact on educational outcomes (access, equity, learning) 
globally; potential volume of additional finances; replicability and scalability; cost-effectiveness at 
scale; sustainability and predictability; and feasibility, ease, speed and cost of implementation.  
Based on this, they then endorse 5 mechanisms as ‘currently ready for implementation’. These 
include: 
 A global financing facility for Education (GFFE) 
An instrument that aims to raise the profile of a particular issue and to crowd in sustainable and 
scalable funds from donor, domestic government and private sources using both traditional and 
innovative financing mechanisms, as well as providing technical support to accelerate 
improvements in the relevant systems at country level (Bellinger et al. 2016: 5). 
 Outcomes-based financing 
Contractual arrangements where a principal (for example, multi or bilateral donor, foundation, 
etc.) transfers funds to the agent (for example government, NGO etc.) in exchange for the 
delivery of specified outcomes. For example, they cite the Education Outcomes Funds proposed 
by Social Finance (Bellinger et al. 2016: 6). It is assumed that this model is largely aligned with 
the models of ‘results-based’ or ‘payment-by-results’ financing cited elsewhere. 
 Education bonds 
A debt investment instrument that links resource mobilization to education development 
objectives. Investment is used to provide a sizeable amount of initial capital that can be re-paid 
over time (Bellinger et al. 2016: 6).  
 Loan buy-downs 
Arrangements where a third party buys down all, or a part of, either or both the interest and the 
principal of a loan between a country and a lending organization, thereby releasing the borrowing 
country from all or some of its future repayment obligation. That generates fiscal liquidity, which 
can be used to fund development (Results for Development Institute, 2013, cited in Bellinger et 
al. 2016: 6). 
 Student financing  
Funding provided directly to students or their families to fund educational access. Innovative 
elements include income-share agreements; the provision of student financing by non-banking 
institutions, and income-contingent loans. As a relevant example, they cite the African Student 
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Finance facility (ASFf) developed by D. Capital Partners, a Dalberg company, which combines 
student financing with advanced market commitments (Bellinger et al. 2016: 6). 
Finally, Terway (2018) focuses in particular on the emerging model of Impact Investment, an 
outcomes-based or payment-by-results model which is presented as a specifically socially-driven 
approach to private investor financing, rather than an investment-driven model. Impact 
investment is described as offering ‘a middle way between pure philanthropy (grant-making) and 
pure financial investment (maximizing financial return)’ and as such has the potential to drive 
financial value and social impact simultaneously (Terway 2018: 10). 
According to Terway, there are high levels of interest in impact investment in education in 
‘emerging markets’ around the world, making it highly attractive to businesses in general. Cited 
evidence includes:  
 Edtech startups received approximately $1.3 billion in funding in 2013 through venture 
funds and other sources (Winters & McNally, 2014, cited in Terway 2018);  
 Merrill Lynch-Bank of America calculating in 2014 that the value of the education sector, 
globally, is $4.3 trillion (Robertson and Komljenovic, 2016, cited in Terway 2018: 11);  
 2018 Business in Africa report calculating that the private investment opportunity for 
education in Sub-Saharan Africa in the next 5 years is worth $13-15 billion in direct 
service provision, and $3-4 billion in ancillary services (Terway 2018: 11). 
Terway presents the following as current examples of impact investment mechanisms operating 
at different levels:  
 The IDP Foundation: profitable microfinance lending to low-cost private schools in Ghana 
that are serving populations not reached by public schools, provided through a delivery 
model that includes extensive training in financial literacy and school management; 
 Educate Global Fund, which raised £25m to invest in grassroots social businesses that 
significantly improve education outcomes; 
 Kiva, a platform for non-profit mircofunds that allows individuals to directly lend money 
via the internet to students and low-income entrepreneurs; 
 The Education, Youth, Employment Bond launched by Inter-American Development 
Bank that raised over $600 million (2014-15) from Wall Street, of which 81% was 
allocated to education projects. 
(Terway 2018: 12) 
Some conclusions 
Firstly, in discussing the efficiency and effectiveness of these financing models associated with 
education, the majority of analysts cited above still focus on an assessment of the mechanisms 
in relation to the achievement of largely financial- or resource-based objectives e.g. raising, 
mobilising or distributing capital; procuring and supplying resources; providing a financial return 
on investment. Exceptions are Bellinger et al. (2016), who include ‘a positive impact on 
educational outcomes (access, equity, learning)’ as part of their assessment of mechanisms, and 
Terway (2018), who presents impact investment approaches as driven by social rather than 
financial outcomes. 
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Secondly, as discussed elsewhere, a number of analysts acknowledge that, in comparison to 
other developmental sectors with high investment potential, education in general requires long-
term investment and offers only low financial returns for investors (Terway 2018; Innovative 
Financing Initiative 2014; Leading Group 2012). This is largely due to sector-specific factors in 
terms of outcomes, such as the importance of delivering at scale in order to attain impact and 
increase the value of investment-return margins, and the long time-horizon on yielding impact-
based returns in the form of quality educational outcomes. As a result, it is difficult to encourage 
private investment in initiatives associated with the education sector in a development context 
(Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 24). 
However, in terms of reaching some conclusions on models and mechanisms, we can see that 
there is a certain amount of overlap on those financial mechanisms for education which are given 
particular priority by analysts. Specifically, there is a general consensus around the potential of 
Education Venture Funds (EdVF), Cash-On-Delivery aid (COD), and Diaspora Bonds. 
However, the extent to which this consensus selection represents agreement over the best 
options for innovative financing in education is potentially undermined by the extensive variety of 
models and mechanisms cited. Furthermore, across the literature as a whole we find the same 
issues raised in relation to the discussion of innovative financing above (see Innovative 
Financing Initiative 2014: 23; Lampert 2014), where opaque language and the use of differing 
terminologies by analysts presents a potentially confused picture of a field with a proliferation of 
possible mechanisms. 
In seeking to address this, when looking more closely at the models cited, many can be fit into 
two or three broader categories of financing types. Of greatest relevance to this study is the 
category termed as results-based financing (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 4) or payment-
by-results (PbR) (Floyd et al. 2017: 1). Examples of mechanisms associated with results-based 
financing cited by the analysts above include: 
 Education Venture Funds 
 Cash-On-Delivery aid 
 Various forms of Private-Public Partnerships 
However, more recent examples of innovative results-based financing mechanisms for education 
that have combined these three approaches include Terway’s (2018) impact investment 
approach, and the two mechanisms currently associated with it: Social Impact Bonds and 
Development Impact Bonds. As the specific focus of this study, these mechanisms will be 
discussed in the following sections of this study. 
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4. An introduction to impact investment and impact bonds 
Introduction 
This section looks specifically at those innovative financing mechanisms for education associated 
with the socially-driven approaches to financing known as ‘Impact Investment’. The section starts 
with a brief overview of the principles and practices associated with impact investment. It then 
goes on to discuss in more detail the forms of financing mechanism associated with impact 
investment: impact bonds, including Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds 
(DIBs). 
An overview of impact investment 
Terway (2018) presents Impact Investment as an investment approach that is driven specifically 
by social objectives, while still operating according to the more standard investment-and-return 
models offered by other approaches. Impact investment is described as offering ‘a middle way 
between pure philanthropy (grant-making) and pure financial investment (maximizing financial 
return)’ and as such has the potential to drive financial value and social impact simultaneously 
(Terway 2018: 10). Floyd et al. (2017) present this as one form within ‘Payment-by-Results’ 
(PbR) financing, but highlight the fact that, while most PbR contracts are delivered by large 
private companies, socially-orientated impact investment finds socially-minded investors paying 
the upfront cost of delivering a social intervention and receiving a return based on the success of 
that intervention. 
The main mechanisms used under impact investment are Impact Bonds. These are described as 
results-based financing tools that help link socially conscious private investors with enterprises 
that aim to deliver social outcomes. In general terms, these mechanisms combine elements of 
investment against outcomes, public private partnerships and payment-by-results financing 
(REACH 2017: 6). 
Key stakeholders  
Typically, there are 3 key actors in an Impact Bond: 
a) An Investor 
b) A Service Provider 
c) An Outcome Funder  
The Investor provides upfront capital to the Service Provider, who then delivers the identified 
services to a population in need. Upon the achievement of pre-agreed targets metrics, the 
Outcome Funder will repay the Investor their initial capital, plus a return. If the impact metrics are 
not met, the Investor is not repaid. The Outcome Funder only pays in the case that desired 
results are delivered (REACH 2017: 6). 
The Investor is frequently a private business or individual with a specific interest in financing 
social development outcomes, or financial institutions operating on their behalf (REACH 2017: 5). 
As investors, they might operate at either a global or domestic level. The Impact Bond provides 
them with both a socially-driven and externally-verified investment opportunity, together with the 
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potential for a financial return. They regain their investment from the Outcome Funders, 
potentially with interest, but only if the outcomes are reached by the Service Providers (REACH 
2017: 8). 
The Service Provider is typically a local non-governmental or civil society organization (NGOs 
or CSOs). They are often small-scale agencies who work closely with the target community, and 
frequently don’t have the revenue to take risks connected to new innovations. At a practical level, 
impact bonds provide them with upfront capital to deliver identified inputs that otherwise might 
not happen without the external financing. At a programmatic level, impact bonds can provide 
them with: flexibility over programme design and delivery, with no funder-dictated inputs or 
prescribed activities; an opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness in design and delivery 
against results; an opportunity for external evaluation and audited evidence of impact. At an 
institutional level, impact bonds provide them access to capacity building support and technical 
assistance from private sector investors and intermediaries, including around delivery, cost 
effectiveness, and data collection and monitoring (REACH 2017: 5). It is also argued that the 
service providers are motivated to ensure delivery as a result of potential reputational risk: 
through the bond, more external attention is paid to their project, so if it does not go well, they 
may lose investors in the future (REACH 2017: 9). 
The Outcome Funder is the institution or agency with a specific strategic or policy-led interest in 
seeing the agreed outcomes being achieved. The Outcome Funder will vary depending on the 
precise type of impact bond - a Social Impact Bond or a Development Impact Bond. In a Social 
Impact Bond, the Outcome Funder is the national government. In a Development Impact Bond, 
the Outcome Funder will be a third-party agency, usually operating in the sphere of social 
development at an international level: they might be a donor agency (e.g. DFID; USAID etc.), a 
foundation (e.g. Gates Foundation), or a private investor (REACH 2017: 6; Gustafsson-Wright et 
al. 2017: 8). Impact bonds provide them with the means of achieving specific developmental 
outcomes, but delivered, firstly, on a payment-by-results model, and secondly, with a reduced 
level of risk since the initial financial investment is provided by the Investor (REACH 2017: 6). It 
is also argued that the engagement of external investors frees up finances for the Outcome 
Funder to invest elsewhere. 
However, in addition to the 3 primary stakeholders, impact bonds are usually supported by two 
further partners. Firstly, there is the Evaluator, an external body who assesses the project and 
verifies that the agreed outcomes have been achieved.  
Secondly, there is the Intermediary: these are usually institutions with a particular focus on 
finance for social development. In the first instance, they work with the Outcome Funders to 
structure and design the bonds, raise capital and arrange negotiations. Secondly, depending on 
the capacity of the Service Provider, Intermediaries may also provide the service provider with 
technical support or capacity development related to financial management, or may also manage 
the programs on behalf of the primary stakeholders (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 9). This 
arrangement is particularly attractive to those institutions who operate as Outcome Funders, 
since it reduces the levels and complexity of their required input into programme delivery and 
management (REACH 2017: 6). However, in practical terms, the current limited field for impact 
bonds means that there are only 3 organisations known to be currently operating as 
Intermediaries: Instiglio, Social Finance UK and Dalberg Capital (Drew & Clist 2015: 11). 
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Finally, each impact bond may also involve other actors providing technical assistance, and/or 
legal advisors knowledgeable in this form of contracting (REACH 2017: 5). 
The current status of Impact Bonds 
As of January 2018, evidence suggests there are 107 impact bonds contracted globally. 104 of 
these are Social Impact Bonds, and 4 are Development Impact Bonds. The social sectors with 
the greatest number of impact bonds are (in order of frequency): 1. Health, 2. Agriculture, 3. 
Employment, 4. Education and 5. Social welfare. 
At a national level, the UK hosted the first impact bond in 2010, and currently has the most 
impact bonds (36 SIBs), followed by USA with 16 bonds. The first impact bond in a low- or 
middle-income country (LMIC) was launched in 2015 in India. There are currently 28 impact 
bonds (27 DIBs, 1 SIB) in LMICs, most operating at a design stage. South Africa is the LMIC with 
the most impact bonds; other countries have 1-3 each (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 15-16; 
Social Finance 2019). 
Social Finance (2018) state that there is an increasing application of Impact Bonds in low-income 
and developing countries, with a particular focus on health issues worldwide. They cite the 
International Committee of the Red Cross program in Congo, Mali and Nigeria, and the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation investment in Cameroon as an example of this trend (Social 
Finance 2018: 3). They also state an increased growth of SIBs in Latin America, operating with 
the support of the Inter-American Development Bank: Mexico, Brazil and Argentina each 
launched new bonds in 2018 (Social Finance 2018: 2), although the sectors of focus are not 
given. 
An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of impact 
investment approaches 
There are a number of described advantages to the approaches taken under impact investment 
and impact bonds. Firstly, this model is described as useful to governments or donors who, as 
Outcome Funders, need to access external risk capital. Secondly, since the model brings 
external private-sector investors into the mix, it is argued that that such partners bring a market-
led approach and a different drive to achieving outcomes. Thirdly, since the programme activities 
are usually based on models previously verified by agencies involved in social development, it 
arguably reduces the levels of risk that usually limit the engagement of external investors 
(REACH 2017: 6; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13). Floyd et al. (2017: 10) suggest that the 
benefits of impact bonds also include: testing innovative new approaches to tackling persistent 
issues, particularly where public sector bodies have a clear idea how much the problem currently 
costs to manage; and scaling up existing models when backed by a strong evidence base where 
providers can demonstrate the likely cost savings. 
More specifically, as a model for delivery of social development outcomes, impact bonds are 
regarded as a suitable tool where there is a clear outcome identified. In general, in both design 
and implementation terms, there is a strong focus on outcomes: outcome funders see impact 
bonds as a way to draw attention to certain results by placing greater incentives to reaching 
them. The focus on results which emerges from the financing mechanism encourages service 
providers to adapt approaches in light of feedback, ensuring that interventions are focused on the 
achievement of the pre-agreed outcomes (REACH 2017: 11; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13). 
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In terms of context, impact bonds are also regarded as suitable for programmes where there are 
a range of anticipated complex contextual factors to negotiate. For example, they are regarded 
as particularly useful in settings where there are a range of specific factors at play, where the 
results chain is not clear beforehand, and where a flexible and adaptive approach to programme 
design and service delivery may be required (REACH 2017: 6). Impact bonds are designed to 
allow for learning and programme change along the way.  
At a systemic level, impact bonds are seen to have the capacity to improve existing performance 
management systems and encourage the establishment of new sector-wide systems in order to 
meet the need for the focus on outcomes and adaptation. The role of Intermediaries and 
Evaluators within the framework is central to this (Drew & Clist 2015). They are also seen to help 
build a sector-wide culture of systemic monitoring and evaluation (REACH 2017: 11; Gustafsson-
Wright et al. 2017: 13). 
It is argued that the multi-partner nature of Impact Bonds can encourage collaboration across the 
public and private sectors, and also across government both vertically and horizontally. For 
Outcome Funders, there is also the potential to increase collaboration between service providers 
working in the same sector and/or serving the same populations (REACH 2017: 12). 
However, there are also some reservations over such claims. Firstly, in terms of programme 
design, Impact Bonds can work well in conditions where there is scope for innovation, including 
through the participation of new collaborative partners and stakeholders beyond state agency 
(REACH 2017: 6). However, in light of both the needs of investors as well as existing questions 
over the extent to which impact bonds can actively foster innovation while still attracting capital 
investments, any innovation also needs to be balanced by some evidence of the model working 
to deliver outcomes, e.g. by introducing interventions or practices that have worked somewhere 
else in the world (REACH 2017: 12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13; Drew & Clist 2015: 10). 
Further to this, Drew & Clist (2015: 10) point to an inherent tension within the impact bond model, 
in that investors have two separate incentives to invest - social and financial returns – and it is 
not always possible to ensure a positive correlation between the two, given that people often 
evaluate market-based and non-monetary transactions according to different criteria (Gneezy & 
Rustihini 2000, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 10). 
Secondly, while there are a range of hypotheses about why impact bonds may be preferable to 
other models of financing in particular situations, so far there is not an evidence-based case for 
choosing impact bonds over other funding models (Floyd et al. 2017: 12). More specifically, at a 
delivery level, there is not yet enough evidence available to show that Impact Bonds can be used 
to deliver projects at scale, or can be used to sustain impact beyond the project lifetime (REACH 
2017: 12; Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 13). In addition, while one of the rationales for impact 
bonds, particularly in a development context, is that they lead to better coordination between 
different parties, there is nothing inherent in their structure that guarantees better coordination 
(Drew & Clist 2015: 14). 
Finally, from a financial perspective, it is not yet clear whether Impact Bonds actually reduce the 
risk of investment for government. Nor is there enough evidence that, by securing private 
investment in specific areas, Impact Bonds enable funding to be released to support initiatives 
elsewhere (REACH 2017: 12; Barder & Perakis 2014, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 10). With this in 
mind, Drew & Clist (2015: 10) suggest that, in some cases, a better comparison may see impact 
bonds as an alternative to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. 
17 
 
5. An overview of Social Impact Bonds 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are an innovative mechanism associated with an impact investment 
approach to financing for social development. They are commonly used in high-income settings, 
or settings with strong government-led public sector financing. Under a Social Impact Bond, you 
have 3 principle stakeholders: 
a) An Investor: a private sector party who provides the capital to fund attainment of specific 
outcomes 
b) A Service Provider: an NGO or CSO who undertakes the design and delivery of the 
programme that will deliver the specific outcomes 
c) An Outcome Funder: in a Social Impact Bond, the Outcome Funder is the national 
government, who repays the Investor their capital investment plus a proportional return at 
the point where the specific outcomes have been attained. 
The principle stakeholders in any SIB are usually supported by two further partners: the 
Evaluator, an external body who assesses the project and verifies that the agreed outcomes 
have been achieved, and the Intermediary, a social financing institution who works with the 
Outcome Funders to structure and design the bonds, arrange negotiations and provide technical 
support (REACH 2017: 6). 
An SIB is described by Loder et al. (2013: 43) as a payment-by-results contract where the 
financial risk is transferred to a consortium of investors. In an investment context, Loder et al. 
present SIBs as being ‘sold on the basis that they will pay for themselves’: namely, that the social 
development outcomes that will result from the bond will reduce long-term government spending, 
and thus cover the costs of the payment-by-results. Loder et al. (2013: 43) claim, firstly, that all 
large-scale SIBs to date have operated according to this logic and, secondly, that this is a 
powerful marketing point in a climate of financial austerity. 
Social Finance (2018) present SIBs as working to overcome the challenges that governments 
have in investing in addressing particular social or developmental issues through prevention and 
early intervention (Social Finance 2018: 1). SIBs are seen to help governments mitigate against 
the financial and design-based risks of failure by engaging investors who want to test innovation 
and scale successful programmes. Investors provide flexible funding to programmes that are 
designed to be responsive to the needs of vulnerable groups to improve their lives (Social 
Finance 2018: 2). This perspective is also echoed by Loder et al. (2013: 43), who state that, 
since the government is typically the Outcome Funder, the outcome in question will generally be 
a socially valuable one - as a result, this makes SIBs attractive to social investors, combining a 
return on risk capital with social impact.  
Further to the above, Floyd et al. (2017: 3-4) state that advocates of SIBs believe that they 
increase the availability and extent of resources to support social interventions, through the 
engagement of external investors, and support the delivery of better social interventions, since 
service providers have the freedom to prioritise outcomes rather than pre-set processes. SIBs 
are also seen to enable governments and other agencies to understand the extent to which 
specific interventions are effective, as well as ‘paying for success’ rather than funding 
interventions that do not work. 
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The current scope and scale of SIBs 
Historically, SIBs were pioneered in the UK, and continue to have a strong presence both in the 
UK and the US working across a broad range of social sectors. In this context, much of the 
evidence cited by commentators (e.g. Floyd et al. 2017; Social Finance 2018; Innovative Finance 
2017) is drawn from UK-based contexts. 
In terms of SIBs and education in particular, according to the Social Finance SIB database 
(https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/ accessed 16.01.19), there are currently 9 SIBs with a 
particular focus on education and early years learning. Countries include: United Kingdom (1); 
United States (2); Canada (1); Portugal (1); Germany (2); South Korea (1); Sweden (1). From the 
perspective of this study, it is important to note three points in relation to this: 
 Firstly, the number of education-focussed impact bonds are relatively low in comparison 
with those from other sectors (e.g. Workforce development – 37 SIBs; Housing – 23 
SIBs; Health – 22 SIBs; Family welfare – 15 SIBs). 
 Secondly, there only 2 impact bonds for education operating in contexts that might be 
described as low- and middle-income or as emerging economies, but both are 
Development Impact Bonds, rather than Social Impact Bonds, and as such will be 
discussed in another section of this study. 
 Thirdly, both DIBs for education are operating only in a single country context - India. 
We can conclude from this that, while there may be evidence of a growth in the use of SIBs in 
low- and middle-income country contexts, primarily due to the need for strong government 
financial capacity, their role in supporting education outcomes in such settings is still at a very 
early stage indeed. 
Approaches to the design of Social Impact Bonds 
Loder et al. (2013: 43) set out a number of conditions for a SIB as a payment-by-results contract 
to work. These include the following:  
 An objectively measurable selection of outcomes on which to base the contract. 
 Confidence that attainment of the measured outcomes come about as a result of the 
programme interventions delivered by the service provider, rather than by other 
actors or contextual factors. 
 A fair balance of risk and return, so that both investors and the government as 
Outcome Funder find the arrangement attractive. 
 Reasonable transaction costs, to ensure that the SIB offers value-for-money 
(Loder et al. 2013: 43) 
While the above indicates a clear strong alignment with the criteria set out by REACH (2017: 6-7) 
in relation to impact bonds more generally, it is worth noting that, unlike REACH, Loder et al. do 
not place a particular priority on alignment with government social policy priorities. 
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In terms of design and implementation, Floyd et al. (2017: 5-6) place a particular emphasis on 
the role of intermediary agencies in the creation and management of SIBs. Compared to funding 
models traditionally open to charity and non-profit organisations, such as grants and small fee-
for-service contracts, many operating within the market regard this performance management 
aspect as the most important element of a SIB, challenging service providers to focus on specific 
outcomes targets or prove that these outcomes have been achieved. 
As with REACH’s 2017 assessment of impact bonds in general, Loder et al. (2013) present SIBs 
as relatively complex to implement. However, as with REACH, Loder et al. also point towards a 
number of enabling trends that are making SIBs and similar payment-by-results contracts simpler 
to deliver in practice. 
Firstly, practical knowledge about how to set up a SIB is increasingly available. Loder et al. 
describe the first SIBs as involving considerable legal support to develop the contract and 
determine the roles and requirements of each participant. Standard format contracts and 
guidance on best practice in procurement and managing processes have since been developed, 
making the process smoother to replicate (Loder et al. 2013: 34). 
Secondly, and related to the above, increased familiarity with SIBs among social development 
funders is leading to a more pragmatic attitude. In particular, measurement is approached in a 
more pragmatic way. In the early SIBs, measurement was done in a precise but complex way 
involving large databases and a carefully matched control group. There is now greater 
recognition and value placed on simpler indicators as measures of attribution (Loder et al. 2013: 
34). 
Thirdly, there is an increased availability of data from central government departments that 
enables outcomes to be designed, tracked and accurately priced. As a sector, education in 
particular is data-rich in the tracking of attainment, progression and attendance. Access to such 
databases has the potential to provide comparative base line performance data against which an 
intervention with a particular cohort could be assessed. While Loder et al. are discussing 
educational financing from a UK-focused perspective, the same principles of data access might 
also apply in other contexts (Loder et al. 2013: 33). 
Finally, from Loder et al.’s largely UK-facing perspective, a final enabling factor is the outcomes 
of on-going investment in a series of well-evidenced interventions, the results from which are 
then used to inform subsequent design (Loder et al. 2013: 33). Looking at approaches to the 
design of their application for educational outcomes in particular, in the UK at least the focus has 
been on interventions in two key areas: addressing issues of educational equity for pupils from 
poorer families; and addressing issues of quality in the field of post-16 vocational education 
(Loder et al. 2013). Key to the success of these interventions were ensuring the buy-in of school-
level stakeholders - teachers, headteachers and school governors – and ensuring that any 
interventions were developed to address identified educational priorities and were delivered in 
keeping with key pedagogic principles (Loder et al. 2013: 31-32). 
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6. An overview of Development Impact Bonds 
Development Impact Bonds are an innovative mechanism associated with an impact investment 
approach to financing for social development. To date, they are exclusively implemented in low- 
and middle-income countries, where weaknesses in government capacity and finance can 
necessitate the engagement of external donor agents to underwrite social development 
interventions. 
In terms of basic design and approach, Development Impact Bonds are very closely related to 
Social Impact Bonds, to the extent that key implementors of social finance do not necessarily 
make a clear distinction between SIBs and DIBs when discussing existing bonds (see, for 
example: Social Finance 2018; Terway 2018: 10; Loder et al. 2013; Social Finance SIB database 
https://sibdatabase.socialfinance.org.uk/ accessed 16.01.19). As discussed elsewhere in this 
study, this issue of clarity over terminology, particularly when combined with the relatively recent 
emergence of DIBs, can contribute to some of the general confusion or misunderstandings 
associated with innovative financing mechanisms, particularly within the international 
development sector. However, within this, Drew & Clist (2015: 2) state that DIBs are recognised 
by DFID as one of three different and specific types of Payment by Results (PbR) financing, 
alongside results-based aid (RBA) and results-based financing (RBF). 
Under a Development Impact Bond, there are 3 principle stakeholders: 
a) An Investor: a private sector party who provides the capital to fund attainment of specific 
outcomes 
b) A Service Provider: an NGO or CSO who undertakes the design and delivery of the 
programme that will deliver the specific outcomes 
c) An Outcome Funder: in a DIB, the Outcome Funder is a third-party agency, usually 
working in partnership with the national government. The difference in Outcome Funders 
is the key distinction between DIBs and SIBs. Under DIBs, Outcome Funders generally 
operate in the sphere of social development at an international level: they might be a 
donor agency (e.g. DFID; USAID etc.), a foundation (e.g. Gates Foundation), or a private 
investor (REACH 2017: 6). The Outcome Funder repays the Investor their capital 
investment plus a proportional return at the point where the specific outcomes have been 
attained. 
As with a SIB, the principle stakeholders in any DIB are usually supported by two further 
partners: the Evaluator, an external body who assesses the project and verifies that the agreed 
outcomes have been achieved, and the Intermediary, a social financing institution who works 
with the Outcome Funders to structure and design the bonds, arrange negotiations and provide 
technical support (REACH 2017: 6).  
In discussing DIBs from a developmental perspective, Drew & Clist (2015: 2) also cite a further, 
sixth stakeholder whose input is to be considered – the target population of beneficiaries. They 
place this group as a 4th ‘principle stakeholder’, alongside the above agents. 
In essence, DIBs operate through private investors providing upfront financing for social 
development programs. Once evidence shows that the programs have achieved pre-agreed 
outcomes, the private investors are then remunerated by the third-party agents (e.g. donors, 
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foundations and/or other private investors) and earn a return (Terway 2018: 10). As with SIBs, 
DIBs differ from standard grant mechanisms because investor returns are based on the 
achievement of a pre-determined outcome (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 18). In 
assessing the delivery of project activities, Drew & Clist present the implementation of a DIB as a 
cyclical process of exchange that moves through 6 stakeholder groups: Investor > Intermediary > 
Service Provider > Target Population > Evaluator > Outcome Funder (2015: 8). However, it is 
worth noting that this model is a hypothetical rather than actual approach to DIB delivery in a 
development context, and that all Drew & Clist’s cited examples come from UK or US contexts. 
The current scope and scale of DIBs 
In the sphere of innovative financing for development, Development Impact Bonds are regarded 
as a very new concept (REACH 2017: 15). They have only been conceptualised in the last 8 
years, and there have only been practical examples in operation within the last 4-5 years.  
Key examples of relevance to this study include, in 2014, the first DIB for education, supporting 
the work of Educate Girls, an NGO operating in government-run schools in Rajasthan, India, to 
enrol and retain girls as well as improve learning outcomes for all children (Innovative Financing 
Initiative 2014: 4; Terway 2018: 10). This DIB was followed by the Quality Education DIB, 
commenced in 2018. See the box below for an overview. 
Commentators state that this decision to roll out and upscale the use of DIBs for education within 
the same national context is specific to a number of enabling factors unique to India. India is 
seen as a good context in which to pilot DIBs as a model for innovative financing. Quality 
Education India (2019) cites the increase in entrepreneurialism in India, the willingness of 
government to work with business and others, the increased levels of financial transparency, and 
the fall in international-aid funding as India's economy has strengthened, as key factors that 
make the country a good setting in which to explore new ways to approach the financing of social 
development. 
Development Impact Bonds for Education 
1. Educate Girls, Rajasthan, India 2015-2018 
The Educate Girls DIB was launched in Rajasthan, India in June 2015. It ran for 3 years, and final outcomes 
were announced in Nov 2018. The project objective was to help improve education and learning outcomes for 
18,000 children in 166 government primary schools in the Indian state of Rajasthan. The project targeted 
enrolment and learning among 9,000 girls not currently enrolled in government primary schools, and a further 
9,000 children in Grades 3-5 (Social Finance 2019; REACH 2017: 3). The project also had a particular focus 
on marginalized girls and boys in remote rural districts. The Educate Girls DIB was the first to be piloted in a 
low- or middle-income country with a non-governmental organisation as Outcomes Funder (Social Finance 
2019).  
2. Quality Education, India 2018-2022 
The Quality Education India DIB was launched in September 2018, and will run for 3-4 years until 2021-2022. 
The project objective is to drive learning outcomes for 300,000 primary school children in India through a 
range of interventions focussed on improving the quality of learning rather than on school enrolment and 
attendance. While it is anticipated that the range of service provider inputs will evolve over the project lifetime, 
initial interventions will include: high-quality privately-operated free schooling in urban slums; leadership 
training for principals and teachers; teacher training in remedial education and multiple-ability classes. 
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The design and focus of Quality Education DIB draws heavily on the design, approaches and impact of the 
Educate Girls DIB 2015-2018. In this context, the service provider on that contract, the NGO Educate Girls 
http://www.educategirls.org/, is also contributing to this DIB in an advisory capacity during 2019 (Social 
Finance 2019ii). 
In comparison with the Educate Girls DIB, the Quality Education India DIB involves a significantly larger initial 
investor contribution: $3m compared with the $297,000 for Educate Girls 2015-2018. Similarly, the current 
total outcome fund is set at $11m, with a view to enabling the size of the DIB to double over the 3-4 year 
lifetime (Quality Education India 2019). 
At a global level, there are currently 27 development impact bonds in LMICs, plus 1 SIB (in 
Columbia), most operating at a design stage. Social Finance (2018) state that there is a 
particular focus on health issues worldwide, citing the International Committee of the Red Cross 
program in Congo, Mali and Nigeria, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
investment in Cameroon as an examples of this trend (Social Finance 2018: 3). The handful of 
other examples of DIBs actually operating in LMICs include Dalberg Capital launching a DIB to 
support malaria prevention and control in Mozambique in 2013 (Innovative Financing Initiative 
2014: 4), workforce development (Workforce Development, Colombia), community income and 
poverty reduction (Village Enterprise DIB, sub-Saharan Africa), and infant health (Kangaroo 
Mother Care, DIB, Cameroon). South Africa is the LMIC with the most DIBs; other countries have 
1-3 each (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 15-16; Social Finance 2019). 
In terms of outcome funders, to date foundations have been the first-movers in investing in DIBs, 
as they tend to be ‘social-first’ investors, and are able to take on more innovative, higher risk 
investments (REACH 2017: 15). However, more development-impact bonds are now under way 
or under discussion with support from donors including DfID, as well as some involvement from 
the World Bank and USAID (The Economist 2018). Nevertheless, within the development 
sphere, there have also been critiques of DIBs (e.g. Oxfam, 2013, cited in Drew & Clist 2015: 
17), arguing that they are being introduced based on limited experience of SIBs and with an 
extremely thin evidence base. 
In terms of investors, within the private sector there have been many investment fora featuring 
DIBs, and there is an increasing level of awareness amongst investors about the instrument 
(REACH 2017: 15). However, investors in the private sector find it challenging to evaluate the 
performance risks of social programs. Investors with a stronger focus on financial returns would 
only likely come into transactions when there is a more substantive track record of DIBs 
achieving financial results and when deals are of larger scale (REACH 2017: 15). Since DIBs are 
a very new concept, continued sharing of data and lessons learnt from existing DIBs will be 
important to raise awareness and confidence among potential new investors (REACH 2017: 15). 
Approaches to the design and delivery of DIBs 
While there is no standard structure, the design of DIBs frequently involve inputs from investors 
that provide capital at the beginning of the project, outcome funders that provide financing if the 
project succeeds, and a service provider to provide inputs related to development goals. 
Critically, they also include a framework for monitoring and evaluation to determine if the service 
provider is successful (Innovative Financing Initiative 2014: 18). 
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As outlined above, in the delivery of project activities from a developmental perspective, Drew & 
Clist present the DIB operating mechanism as a cyclical process of exchange that moves 
through 6 stakeholder groups: Investor > Intermediary > Service Provider > Target Population > 
Evaluator > Outcome Funder (2015: 8). However, they also state that the possible range of 
different contractual arrangements is huge, so the above is a necessarily simplified model.  
In terms of design and implementation, Drew & Clist (2015: 21-27) present an overall framework 
that could be used for the evaluation of DIBs within the context of international development. Key 
features of this framework are that it provides a model that can be used to evaluate both 
processes and impact of DIBs, mapped according to the key criteria of relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability. A further discussion of the key areas where stakeholders 
might benefit from technical support in the design and implementation of DIBs and other 
innovative financing mechanisms is provided in the final section of this report. 
Drew & Clist also highlight in particular the multiple roles of the intermediary (2015: 11). These 
roles include: in design, coordinating the identification of the opportunity as an investable 
opportunity and getting it to market; in delivery, frequently operating as the main source of 
innovation and monitoring; in implementation, monitoring activities with a strong focus on service 
improvement and delivery of results.  
In discussing the remaining partners, Drew & Clist (2015: 11) state that there is not necessarily 
any change in roles for a service provider operating within a traditional aid project or a DIB, 
although they may be expected to demonstrate greater contractual flexibility and use inputs in 
different ways. With regard to the outcome funder, Drew & Clist (2015: 13) state that, while the 
logic of impact bonds reduces funder risk through payment based only on measured outcomes, 
in practice, it seems that the outcome funder will sometimes pay in advance for piloting and 
scoping at the early stages of a DIB. Since these investments could lead nowhere, such 
practices do not enable DIBs to completely remove the risk of funding. 
Finally, while Drew & Clist highlight the importance of the target population as a key stakeholder 
within impact bonds in a developmental context, they also go on to state that the target 
population is generally ‘the silent partner’ in any actual DIB (2015: 12). In fact, their agency in 
design terms is reduced to the point where a DIB only needs to satisfy the outcome funder’s 
requirements that ‘the target population will be heard, that there are no significant negative 
consequences of the agreement, and that positive effects are likely and achievable’. From a 
social development perspective, it is suggested the implications of this standpoint require some 
further significant scrutiny. 
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7. Areas of possible technical support to innovative 
financing 
Introduction 
This section commences with an overview of those aspects of innovative financing in a 
development context where the stakeholder institutions are likely to benefit from technical 
support. It goes on to look in more detail at the specific aspects of design and implementation 
where technical support might be required, as well as the specific inputs or approaches to 
support that might be provided. 
Aspects of innovative financing requiring technical support 
In looking at the areas of possible technical support for innovative financing, UNESCO (2016) set 
out a number of inputs or design elements that they see as prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of innovative financing in a development context.  
Firstly, country-level ownership over innovative financing is necessary to ensure successful 
results over the long term. This includes putting in place mechanisms for stakeholder 
engagement in the governance structures of innovative financing initiatives; ensuring full 
alignment of any financing with nationally devised education strategies and plans; the inclusion of 
direct budget and/or sector-wide support as part of any innovative financing; and processes for 
the development and management of country-devised project proposals (UNESCO 2016: 5).  
Secondly, any innovative financing mechanism must include stakeholder capacity development 
as part of intervention design. Any innovative financing intervention must, therefore, balance 
‘quick wins’ in terms of results and outcomes with long-term capacity development goals 
(UNESCO 2016: 5). 
Thirdly, the establishment of any innovative financing initiative must ensure complementarity and 
effective coordination with parallel initiatives. Without such an approach, the creation of new 
financing structures to deliver education financing will only stretch capacity and reduce overall 
effectiveness of delivery (UNESCO 2016: 5). 
Fourthly, and closely related to the above, donors in particular need to ensure clarity on how 
innovative financing should be ‘counted’, for example as part of country-level commitments, in 
order to reduce substitution risks and ‘double-counting’. Although many forms of external finance 
have dual development and education objectives, they each need to be counted and assessed 
separately next to different international commitments, such as the UN target of 0.7 percent 
ODA, or commitments to SDG 4 (UNESCO 2016: 5). 
Finally, innovative financing programmes should be designed to deliver predictable finance so as 
to ensure maximum aid effectiveness. Multiple mechanisms will tend to generate more revenues 
in good economic times compared to bad, and this holds particular issues for financing 
partnerships with private investors. Such mechanisms will be procyclical, or grow simultaneously 
with the economy. Thus it may be useful to consider ways in which some instruments could 
deliver resources in a countercyclical setting - i.e. provide financing while moving in the opposite 
direction of the overall state of an economy (UNESCO 2016: 5). 
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In partial response to the above, and looking at innovative financing at a macro level, Terway 
(2018) highlights the need for technical support to ensure responsible engagement and equitable 
partnership, based on a hybrid model of social and financial return. Firstly, this will involve 
operating across multiple agencies including businesses, philanthropists, non-profits, 
governments, civil society, social entrepreneurs, researchers, and aid agencies. Secondly, it will 
involve co-ordinating a range of activities, including:  
 rigorous research on engagement processes and outcomes;  
 further debate on motivations for participation in investment the education sector;  
 defining desirable outcomes and outcome indicators;  
 seeking clarity over regulation over private sector contributions to public benefit; 
 development and provision of guidelines for responsible investment and engagement 
(Terway 2018: 13) 
Finally, looking at results-based financing in general and impact investment in particular, 
Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 7) identify five key issue areas in the design and implementation 
of impact bonds where technical support is likely to be required: 
1. Identifying appropriate interventions and service providers. 
2. Managing relationships with government and donor outcome funders. 
3. Identifying metrics and structuring payments. 
4. Developing the operating model, structuring the vehicle, and raising capital. 
5. Implementing the impact bond and measuring impact. 
 
Approaches to providing technical support to innovative financing 
in a development context 
When designing and implementing innovative financing mechanisms in a development context, a 
key difference compared to operating in a high-income context is the greater need for risk 
management. This involves the development of contextual understanding about the needs of 
outcome funders and investors in a riskier environment. For impact bonds in high-income 
countries, one of the driving forces has been the idea that the payment by government – as seen 
in SIBs – is drawn from the future cost savings provided by successful preventive interventions. 
In developing contexts—and particularly in DIBs, where the outcome funder is not the 
government—quantifying the value of interventions to each organization is more complicated, 
and in these cases future savings are less likely to be a strategic driving force (Gustafsson-
Wright et al. 2017: 9). 
In the provision of technical support, Drew & Clist highlight the multiple roles of the Intermediary 
(2015: 11). These roles include: in design, coordinating the identification of the opportunity as an 
investable opportunity and getting it to market; in delivery, frequently operating as the main 
source of innovation and monitoring; in implementation, monitoring activities with a strong focus 
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on service improvement and delivery of results. Many investors have indicated they are happy to 
delegate much of the active monitoring to the intermediary (Deloitte, undated, cited in Drew & 
Clist 2015: 11) who, as a result, takes on the role of managing and monitoring the implementing 
agencies. With this in mind, we might assume that, within an impact investment model, the 
intermediary agency is the main source of technical support and advice to other stakeholders. 
In terms of designing any technical support to assist stakeholders, there are a number of stages 
involved in the design and implementation of innovative financing mechanisms where inputs 
might be required. In the case of impact bonds, for example, although each mechanism will vary 
according to context and need, four major stages have been identified as part of the design and 
process (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2017: 10-11), and any technical support can be targeted to 
help address each these as required: 
1. A feasibility study, during which the social challenge is identified and the feasibility of 
using an impact bond to resolve that challenge is explored; 
2. Structuring the deal, during which an outcome funder must agree to enter the contract, 
capital must be raised, the technical details of the specific intervention and outcome 
metrics are decided, the service provider is procured, and contracts are finalized; 
3. Implementation, during which services are provided and the performance of the service 
provider is monitored and managed; 
4. Evaluation and repayment, during which verification of agreed-upon outcomes takes 
place and payment to investors occurs contingent upon their achievement. 
Under each of these staged tasks, there are a number of approaches where technical support 
can assist the stakeholders. These are discussed below.  
Establishing the feasibility of an intervention 
Firstly, as a tool for delivering social development under the approaches used in impact 
investment, bonds are seen to be most effective when certain basic programmatic conditions are 
met. In fulfilling this, technical support can help the stakeholders to:  
 ensure that programme outcomes are clear and objectively measurable;  
 have programme outcomes that can be achieved in a reasonable time horizon, e.g. the 
demonstration of intermediate or final results within a maximum of 5-6 years; 
 have a developmental focus that is both a government and donor priority, and which is 
also of interest to external investors. 
In addition, it is also seen as important to have in place government statutory support and legal 
structures that can support and enforce programme delivery (REACH 2017: 6-7). This is 
particularly important in the case where the government, rather than a third party, is the Outcome 
Funder. In the case that such mechanisms are not in place with appropriate levels of strength, 
arguably the Intermediary agent or other technical support agent can help the stakeholders 
identify the issue, and then work with the government to help establish or strengthen them. 
Identifying and engaging partners 
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Engaging with national governments, international donors and others operating in the public 
sector, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, can add levels of complexity to 
establishing innovative financing mechanisms. In such settings, it also often takes a long time to 
engage with and secure commitment an external investor (REACH 2017: 10). However, it is 
necessary for any intervention to establish these relationships as quickly as possible.  
Technical support can work with stakeholders to: identify and secure an outcome funder and 
engage them in the design process; ensure all are on board with the timeline, costs, and metrics; 
and ensure that the bond is aligned with stated strategic and policy priorities for all stakeholders 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 31).  
Other challenge areas that technical support can help with include: planning for shifting 
contextual circumstances e.g. changes of government, or wider political or social instability; 
addressing institutional capacity for effectively managing multiple programme funding and donor 
stakeholders; and negotiating power imbalances between national government and international 
investors or funders (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 32-33). 
Finally, as part of the process of identifying and selecting key stakeholders, particularly service 
providers, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 27) also outline a number of criteria that technical 
support can consider when assessing organisations. 
Designing and structuring the intervention 
When considering the initial structuring and design process of any innovative financing 
intervention, firstly, the importance placed on results generates new levels of diligence on all 
parties when designing the theory of change. Technical support can assist in agreeing realistic 
incentives and results, and significant time is also spent on developing the monitoring systems 
and rigorous ways of measuring outcomes (REACH 2017: 12). The role of the key stakeholders 
– the Investor, the Service Provider and the Outcome Funder - and their institutional experience 
can be key in helping inform this process. 
Secondly, the use of an evidence base in developing a theory of change is helpful, there is a 
need to have a high degree of confidence in the relationship between the intervention’s proposed 
inputs and outputs, and desired outcomes and impact. All stakeholders—investors, outcome 
funders, and service providers—must agree that the proposed intervention will deliver the 
desired outcomes and impact. However, a lack of data can be a challenge in low-income 
countries. In such contexts, technical support for scoping research to establish an evidence base 
may be necessary, although it is often expensive and time-consuming. As a result, technical 
support can also advise on the important trade-off between establishing an evidence base and 
keeping design costs within reason: for example, in some situations, an evidence base from a 
similar intervention might substitute. Regardless, it is essential to ensure that evidence is 
adequate to attract all stakeholders to the proposed intervention (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 
26). 
Thirdly, technical support can assist with the identification of metrics for the measurement of 
outputs and outcomes, a central aspect of the structuring and design process. Clearly these will 
vary hugely from context to context, although there are a number of basic criteria that can inform 
their development. In general terms, any metrics must be measurable, in that the data can be 
easily gathered and the progress tracked. In addition, they must be meaningful, in that they are 
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aligned with the social development changes that the outcome funders wish to see. Finally, the 
metrics should be set at an appropriate level, in that they are both achievable based on the 
service provider capacity, but impactful, in terms of levels of social change that will result. Further 
to this, the timeframe for delivery must be realistic, at the same time as meeting investor 
expectations (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 37). 
Finally, from a financial perspective, technical support can assist the structuring and design 
process to take account of transaction costs. These costs will vary depending on the size and 
complexity of the deal, as well as the context in which the programme is operating. Key 
categories for cost items include: service provider inputs; supervision costs; costs associated 
with provision of technical support and capacity development; assessment and evaluation of 
project outcomes; levels of return to investors (REACH 2017: 8). Structuring these in terms of 
payments to both service providers and investors needs to take account of incentives for 
engagement, timeliness and quality of delivery. However, at the same time, there is a need to 
ensure that financial incentives do not divert providers from the delivery of the desired 
developmental outcomes (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2017: 38). 
In addition to technical support, there are a range of materials and learning that can be shared 
across bonds in order to speed the technical and financial aspect of the structuring and design 
process. These materials include, for example: key questions to answer during the feasibility 
scoping process; considerations around IB structuring (financial, legal, governance); contracting 
templates including key terms for the various contracts; and data and performance management 
systems, evaluation frameworks etc (REACH 2017: 10). Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 41-48) 
provide further guidelines associated with the legal and managerial structuring of impact bonds. 
However, at the same time, there will inherently be differences in terms of the project context, 
including target population, intervention approach, political and cultural context etc (REACH 
2017: 10). 
Implementing the intervention 
Fourthly, in terms of implementation, technical support can help develop funding solutions when 
projects are complex and require a flexible design approach, as is often the case with impact 
investment models. For example, the programme design may involve a form of rapid prototyping, 
followed by initiating the intervention swiftly, then collecting feedback while allowing for 
programmatic flaws, followed by a process of redesign and re-iteration. This would take three 
cycles or more and takes time (REACH 2017: 9). In this context, both the design process and the 
return on investment can take time.  
As a key part of the implementation process, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 51-52) point 
towards the importance of performance management to investors, whose capital is at risk, and to 
outcome funders, who are seeking to achieve lasting social impact. In terms of technical support 
to assist with this, they outline a range of options for performance management that is led by 
investors, service providers and/or third-parties, highlighting a range of factors that can assist in 
decision-making over performance management roles. These include institutional experience 
and capacity, contextual knowledge and technical experience. 
Evaluation 
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In terms of technical support for evaluation, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 49) state that the 
choice of methodology, particularly in impact investment, is dependent on 5 considerations:  
1. what the outcome funder is seeking to achieve;  
2. contextual issues such as the availability of data or the presence of a comparison group; 
3. the timeline of the contract and how much time is available for data collection and 
analysis;  
4. the budget for evaluation;  
5. the political sensitivities around the intervention.  
They go on to discuss the factors to consider against each of these considerations (2017: 50-51), 
and also point out that validated administrative data is the most commonly used evaluation 
method for impact bonds in developing countries, and also in high-income countries, a finding 
supported by Floyd et al. (2017: 10). Floyd et al. (2017: 10) go on to state that, while 
administrative data models do not attempt to measure the performance of an impact bond 
against a counterfactual, some advocates argue that properly-documented expectations of what 
would happen without the intervention are the equivalent of a counterfactual. 
While Floyd et al. (2017: 10) also indicate the role of comparative evaluation models, which 
measure the outcomes achieved by a group of beneficiaries against the outcomes achieved by a 
comparable group of people, Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017: 23) argue that the relative absence 
of this model in practice may be in light of the high cost of quasi-experimental evaluations and 
experimental designs, or randomized controlled trials (RCTs).  
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